South Africa and Zimbabwe

THE fallout from a Zimbabwean presidential election blighted by state orchestrated repression and riddled with malpractices will be most keenly felt within the Southern African region itself, not least by South Africa, the regional hegemon (see last month's Contemporary Review). How are we to explain the South African response to the election outcome and what are the implications of that response for Pretoria's own international reputation and for the future political trajectory of South Africa itself?

The Predictable Mr

The Zimbabwean presidential election of 9-10 March 2002 represented the latest milestone in that country's long descent into outright despotism. The official 'victory' of Robert was so tarnished by the state sponsored violence unleashed in advance of the poll, and by the rampant fraud accompanying it, that it effectively signalled the demise of elections in Zimbabwe as credible tests of popular opinion. However, as Robin , the former British ambassador to South Africa in the 1980s, has recognised, it also demonstrated 's willingness to destroy the country before he would consider relinquishing control of it. That said, reprehensible though it was, s behaviour was hardly unexpected. The pre-election period had witnessed the passage of emergency legislation designed to stifle independent media coverage, the imposition of tight restrictions on election monitors (both local and international), the routine use of violence against opposition supporters and activists, and the denial of oppo sition access to a state controlled media which behaved throughout as a mouthpiece for the ruling party, ZANU-PF. Finally, came 's coup de grace: the decision to place the Zimbabwean armed forces--which are now effectively acting as the military wing of ZANU-PF as constitutional order collapses--formally in charge of the election. The military responded by announcing that they would not accept any result that went 'against the revolution'. All of this demonstrated very cleanly that the regime was simply not prepared to allow the election to become a vehicle through which real democratic change could be secured.

Perhaps more discouraging for those committed to a democratic Zimbabwe, however, was the complacent response of South Africa, the regional superpower. In its public reaction accepting, indeed welcoming, the official outcome, South Africa provided a tacit endorsement of 's violent excesses, a response which--unless it is radically revised in the months ahead--threatens to deal a lethal blow to Pretoria's international standing and to the country's post-1994 aspiration to be an evangelist for the expansion of democratic government on the African continent.

Constructive Engagement and Beyond

The South African approach to Zimbabwe's escalating crisis has been to take the route of quiet diplomacy, a policy designed to encourage to change course from the lawlessness, violent coercion and racial scapegoating which he has actively encouraged since losing the constitutional referendum of February 2000. That policy had recorded few, if any, tangible achievements by the end of 2001 as Zimbabwe plunged further into state sponsored anarchy and repression but the acid test of Pretoria's policy was always going to be its ability to ensure that the presidential election of March 2002 was conducted according to strict democratic ground-rules. That it was not is now a matter of record as a cluster of observer missions quickly confirmed. The Norwegian mission reported that the poll lacked 'integrity' and 'failed to meet the key broadly accepted criteria for elections'. The parliamentary mission of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) reported that the electoral process 'could not be said to a dequately comply with the norms and standards for elections in the SADC region' and the report of the Commonwealth observer mission stated bluntly that the conditions in Zimbabwe 'did not adequately allow for a free expression of the will by the electors'. Given the grim reality of a clearly fraudulent, in fact rigged, election, the international community waited for the response of South Africa, the regional leader and the one state with the economic leverage and diplomatic weight to apply real pressure on . When it came it was a profound disappointment. The South African election observer mission, in a display of quite tortuous semantics, described the election as 'legitimate' but not necessarily 'free and fair', an intellectual gyration that is likely to enter political folklore and which swiftly exposed the observer team to ridicule. Far from distancing itself from this eccentric finding, however, South Africa's ruling African National Congress (ANC) was quick to endorse it. The ANC's spokesperson, Smuts Ngnoyama described the election as a legitimate expression of the popular will, minor administrative blemishes notwithstanding, and he offered 'warm congratulations to ZANU-PF and President for a convincing majority win'. President himself declared that 'the will of the people of Zimbabwe has prevailed'. To those journalists who had been based in Zimbabwe throughout the campaign, to the majority of electoral observer missions, and to the Zimbabwean opposition itself, this verdict was considered a travesty and a betrayal of the very democratic and non-racial values championed by the ANC throughout its own history.

Explaining Pretoria's Position

Two factors have been of overriding importance in shaping and informing South Africa's controversial policy of so-called 'constructive engagement' towards Zimbabwe.

President has worked assiduously to keep his policy within the African, although not international, mainstream since February 2000. Central to this has been an underlying resentment that Western powers were once again seeking to determine an African state's future coupled with the view that Zimbabwe only enjoyed a salience in Western political discourse because of the maltreatment of a privileged racial minority, the white farmers. To this extent 's bombastic anti-colonial (and anti-white) rhetoric--and his attempt to depict himself as a plucky opponent of 'Western imperialism'--has found a receptive audience in parts of the continent, although, curiously, such a view has managed to overlook the fact that the overwhelming majority of ZANU-PF's victims have been black Zimbabweans. was also anxious to avoid any repeat of the isolation South Africa experienced in 1995 as a result of the actions of the military dictatorship in Nigeria when Mandela sought to impose a punitive policy without adequ ately consulting African opinion. is clearly looking to re-establish his country's African credentials after a period in which many on the continent suspected that South Africa was becoming a 'Trojan horse' for the political, economic, and strategic interests of the West and his Zimbabwe policy is an expression of that. Nor should we underestimate the instinctive tendency of African regimes and leaders to close ranks, largely at the expense of African peoples it might be added. That tendency has repeatedly manifested itself within the continent's various inter-governmental organisations and has been a major impediment to Africa's political and economic progress in the independence era.

South Africa has long argued that a 'softly softly' approach to the regime was justified by the potential destabilising consequences of punitive economic measures. A tightening economic squeeze, which only South Africa had the capacity to impose, would have hastened the political and economic implosion of Zimbabwe, might have rebounded on Pretoria to disastrous effect via a mass in influx of refugees, disrupted trade links, and caused generalised chaos on its borders. 'Unlike others, pontificating from afar, we have to live with the consequences of collapse', was the official South African mantra. Thus, Pretoria deemed it preferable to make its influence felt through a less confrontational diplomatic approach. Such an approach has stubbornly ignored the powerful evidence that the existing policy--effectively relying upon to behave more responsibly whilst allowing him a free rein--is itself hastening that country's disintegration, is bringing about precisely the same situation on South Africa's b order, and is inflicting massive economic damage on the wider region (as much as $25 billion worth of damage according to an estimate by the Economic Affairs Council in September 1991).

The Damage to South Africa's Reputation

Constructive engagement did not enjoy a good press from its inception but it now appears to have exhausted all credibility in light of 's behaviour during the presidential campaign where he gave not the slightest indication that he was sensitive to international or regional pressure to adhere to democratic norms. Moreover, in light of the statements of the observer mission and of various ANC spokespersons it was reasonable to ask whether 'constructive engagement' with had not spilled over into outright collaboration. If that should become a universal perception then it is likely to inflict incalculable damage on South Africa's broader international interests. The passive South African response to events in Zimbabwe raises two questions in particular, each of which has serious implications for Pretoria's reputation as a force for democratic progress on the continent.

Thabo 'big idea' unveiled in 1996 was that of an 'African renaissance', a regeneration of the continent on every level--economic, social, and political. Central to that rejuvenation was to be the expansion of liberal democratic values, the promotion of human rights, and the closer integration of the continent with the international economy. That broad philosophising has since been given real policy content with the launch of the New Partnership for African Development (Nepad), a contract between the world's richest and poorest nations in which greater aid, debt relief, and trade access will be offered in exchange for democratic progress, good governance, and progress in tackling corruption. South Africa has been a leader in this project, indeed the key African interlocutor with the richer states, yet the events in Zimbabwe, and South Africa's response to those events, challenges the premise on which Nepad has been constructed. Implicit in that agreement is an expectation that the continent will make d emocratic progress and that existing democratic states--especially regional leaders such as South Africa--should play a dynamic role in steering the continent in that direction. To rail against external pressure or to attempt to separate the potential economic benefits of Nepad from the political requirements--and to depict the Zimbabwe election as an 'internal affair' undermines both the spirit and substance of the agreement South Africa itself helped engineer. If it becomes apparent that certain African states have no intention of taking Nepad seriously as a guide to political conduct--and that other leading African states are prepared to acquiesce in that--then the project is doomed. Zimbabwe generates negative external perceptions of the whole continent and by appearing to connive at 's excesses South Africa risks jeopardising its reputation as the African state with the keenest appreciation of global economic and political dynamics.

urgently needs to rediscover and to promote the vision of a more outward looking Africanism which seeks Africa's full engagement within the international system, rather than the insular, brooding, and even paranoid Africanism typified by . In a country desperate to secure increased foreign direct investment (and one disappointed by its own performance in this regard since 1994) it would be extreme folly for South Africa to give the impression that it considers 's lawless behaviour to be acceptable. Indeed, a shot across Pretoria's bows was fired by Washington in the immediate aftermath of the poll when a White House spokesman, An Fleischer, warned that the outcome posed a 'direct threat to the democratic aspirations of southern Africa' and that countries legitimising the result would be sending 'a negative signal to the rest of the world about African states' commitment to the rule of law and democracy'. It is therefore vital for Pretoria to distance itself from Robert if it is to avo id guilt by association, bolster investor confidence, and preserve the 'African renaissance' concept as something more than grandiose but ultimately vacuous rhetoric.

The South African government's passive response to events in Zimbabwe inevitably raises awkward questions about the depth of its own commitment to democracy. On one level the two states are barely comparable given the liberal democratic values which underpin South Africa's 1996 Constitution, its thriving civil society, and desire to position the country firmly within the international mainstream. That said, Pretoria's indulgence of 's authoritarian rule and its rapid and unseemly endorsement of electoral theft on such a grand scale invites an obvious question: could the ANG, currently in a position of overwhelming political dominance, resort to such machinations and scape goating should it ever find its own dominance eroding? Added to this is the liberation factor. Liberation movements around the world have rarely, if ever, considered themselves to be 'just another player' within a post-liberation political process. Rather, they tend to view themselves as having a unique status, a special histor ical mission to govern, an attitude wholly incompatible with healthy pluralist politics, robust inter-party debate, and an acceptance of the alternation of parties in government. The historical record shows that when an African liberation movement is confronted by a serious political challenge its reflex response is repression, intimidation and demonisation of the opposition, a pattern visible in Algeria, Malawi, Kenya, and now Zimbabwe. Given the ANG's notorious sensitivity to criticism (whether it emanates from the opposition or from the media), and its craven attitude to , optimism that South Africa can buck the trend is inevitably diminishing.

Conclusion: Finding a Way Forward

President urgently needs to contrive a way out of this vexed situation, one that simultaneously manages to advance the cause of democracy in Zimbabwe, addresses regional realities, and restores South Africa's global standing. The Zimbabwean situation seems set to worsen still further given 's instinctive authoritarianism, his anarchical social policies, the inevitable isolation of the country from international development assistance (thus ensuring further decline for an economy already ravaged by gross corruption and mismanagement), and the extreme polarisation of the country's political life. In the immediate aftermath of the election was using the new draconian Public Order and Security Act to prohibit any opposition or trade union protests and his behaviour -- and that of his supporters -- suggests that he remains firmly locked into a zero-sum game mentality in which the total destruction of the opposition is being sought. One Zimbabwean political analyst, John Makumbe, anticipated this well in advance of the poll when, in a display of gallows humour, he noted: 'There is light at the end of the tunnel. The problem is that keeps building more tunnel'. (The Observer, 34 September 2001) All of this will soon render useless the feeble policy Pretoria has pursued thus far, one of equivocation, deferral, and outright denial, a policy entirely unworthy of the region's leading state. Detailed discussion of any new South African policy approach lies beyond the scope of this article but any credible initiative must flow from a recognition of two stark realities: first, the self-destructive nature of South Africa's current policy and, second, the extreme malevolence of a regime which represents the very antithesis of the ideals of own 'African renaissance' project. Only time will tell if the decision taken on 19 March to suspend Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth for one year is evidence of just such a policy shift or is merely a token gesture: to appease international critics before the resumption of business as usual. However, for South Africa to continue subordinating its real interests--whether domestic, regional or global--to the defence of a pariah such as would be the definitive case of allowing the tail to wag the dog. The need for to act is all the greater since increased his pressure on the white farmers last month. Thabo capacity to demonstrate real statesmanship and leadership--about which there is justifiable scepticism given his hitherto inept handling of both the Zimbabwean situation and his own country's HIV-AIDS crisis--is about to undergo a most searching examination.